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This paper examines whether integration of national markets fosters inno-
vation in the technologically inferior country. In a simple set up where a
technologically backward home ﬁrm and a technologically advanced foreign
ﬁrm compete in qualities and prices in an integrated market, we ﬁnd that the
outcome depends on the speed of response of the two ﬁrms and their initial
technological distance. If the domestic ﬁrm is not too far behind the foreign
ﬁrm to begin with, and if it responds faster, then the technological gap may
get reversed. Further, we ﬁnd that integration may be welfare improving for
both the countries. There are, however, distributional implications. While
the consumers always gain from such integration, the ﬁrms may not.
Key words: Innovation; Technological Gap; Market Integration; Quality
Competition.
JEL Cl. Nos.: D43, F15, O33.1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the eﬀects of integration of national markets on
the technological level of countries. We contend that integration creates
technological opportunities for both countries, and the outcome depends on
which country manages to grab these opportunities. While this idea seems
to crop up in the popular debate quite frequently, it has not been been
formalized theoretically. In this paper we provide a very simple model that
can capture this idea.
In countless debates on costs and beneﬁts of globalization and trade lib-
eralization, one important beneﬁt for the developing countries that has often
been perceived is that they provide impetus to the technologically backward
producers to innovate and enhance product qualities1. That trade protection
had made Indian ﬁrms inward looking and therefore non-innovative during
the 1970s and 1980s has been strongly argued by Desai (1980) and Lall
(1989). Porter (1990) and White (1974) also had observed that too much
market power for the domestic ﬁrms is not conducive for innovation. These
arguments share the same Darwinian view that product market competition
forces ﬁrms to innovate in order to survive. Segerstrom et. al. (1990) have
provided theoretical basis of such an argument in a dynamic general equi-
librium model of North-South trade: Northern tariﬀs on Southern exports
lower the pace of innovation in the North.
But this is not an unchallenged position or self-enforcing proposition,
both theoretically and empirically. This is evident from diﬀerences in opin-
ion within the EEC during the mid 1980s regarding appropriate trade policy
to induce technologically backward domestic industries to innovate. The
German view was that the domestic producers should be exposed to inter-
national competition, whereas the French supported the idea of protection
till such time the domestic industries close their technology gap [Pearce and
Sutton (1986)]. Of late, in a case study of 1246 Turkish manufacturing ﬁrms,
Pomukcu (2000) does not ﬁnd any impact of competition in domestic market
coming from imports on innovation decisions of ﬁrms during 1989-93. On
the other hand, contrary to adverse impact of trade protection on innovation
decision, Rodrik (1992) has demonstrated that tariﬀ protection fosters inno-
vation and prepones technological catch-up similar in spirit of the Schum-
1Quality problems in developing countries are, of course, not just technological. Asym-
metric information and associated problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, on
the one hand, and reputation problem in contestable nature of markets in the developing
countries, on the other hand, are also equally important factors underlying such a prob-
lem [Chiang and Masson (1988), Donnenfeld and Mayer (1989), Shapiro (1984), Rashid
(1988)].
1peterian idea that monopoly power and innovation are positively related.
Similar positive eﬀect of tariﬀ on domestic innovation has been observed by
Reitzes (1991) in a two-stage Cournot game.
These theoretical arguments have been further supplemented by two re-
sults established more recently in the context of an erstwhile protected mo-
nopolistic market. First, a reduction of tariﬀ on low-quality imports lowers
the incentive for a domestic monopolist to develop the high-quality variety
through R&D [Acharyya and Bandyopadhyay (2003)]. Second, lowering of
tariﬀ on imported inputs necessary for production of high-quality varieties
does not always induce domestic ﬁrms to enhance product quality through
innovation of complementary inputs [Bandyopadhyay and Acharyya (2004)].
To resolve the debate over the implication of trade liberalization and mar-
ket integration on the innovation decision of the ﬁrms, we take an altogether
diﬀerent approach in this paper. We ﬁrst endogenize the pre-integration
technological limits (and asymmetry) of monopolistic ﬁrms in the two coun-
tries through their choices of optimal innovation levels in separate national
markets2. Such innovation levels are determined by the size of the respective
national markets and the willingness-to-pay of the domestic citizens. Given
such endogenously determined technological asymmetry of ﬁrms, we then ex-
amine their incentives for further innovation under the threat of quality and
price competition when the national markets are integrated. Integrating the
two national markets creates technological opportunities for both the ﬁrms,
but which one of the ﬁrms manage to take advantage of this opportunity
depends on the response speed of the two ﬁrms, and their pre-integration
quality levels. If the initial quality level of the home-country ﬁrm is too low
to begin with, then it can never take advantage of these new opportunities.
But, if the domestic ﬁrm is not too far behind to begin with, then the out-
come depends on the relative speed of response3. If the foreign ﬁrm responds
faster (i.e. it is the ﬁrst mover in the R&D stage), then the technological gap
between the two ﬁrms widens, and the foreign ﬁrm grabs the beneﬁts. If,
however, the domestic ﬁrm is responds faster (i.e. the ﬁrst mover in the R&D
phase), then the technological gap may get reversed, so that the domestic
ﬁrm may grab the technological lead.
Further, we ﬁnd that integration is welfare improving for both the coun-
2The analysis that comes closest to ours in this regard is that of Clemenz (1990), who,
however, does not consider heterogenous consumer set in the two countries.
3There are some comparable results in New Growth Theory at least in respect of initial
conditions as the driving force of the pace of innovation. Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and Devereux and Lapham (1994), for example, show that if there are only national
knowledge spill-overs, innovation fades away in a country which is identical to another
country in all respects, but starts oﬀ with a smaller number of innovative goods.
2tries. There are, however, distributional implications. While the consumers
always gain from such integration, the ﬁrms may, or may not. Whether a
ﬁrm gains or not depends on the pre-integration technological distance be-
tween the two countries, as well as the response speed of the two ﬁrms to the
integration. If either the domestic ﬁrm is too far back technologically, or is
slow to respond, then the foreign ﬁrm gains, whereas the domestic ﬁrm loses.
Otherwise, it is the domestic ﬁrm that gains, whereas the foreign ﬁrm loses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set out
the assumptions and the basic framework. Choice of initial technology limits
in separate national markets is discussed thereafter. Section 3.1 analyzes
quality and price competition between technologically asymmetric home and
foreign ﬁrms in an integrated market. Iincentives for further innovation are
examined in section 3.2. Section 4 discusses the gains from market integration
in terms of the standard measure of national welfare. Finally, we conclude
the paper in section 5.
2 Innovation in Separate Markets
2.1 The Economic Environment
To begin with, consider two separated markets in two countries - home and
foreign. Each market is monopolized by a single native ﬁrm. A good X with
variable and observable quality, indexed by q, is oﬀered by the monopolists
in each of these markets.
The decision-making in both the markets follows a two stage process.
First, through R&D, the ﬁrms develop a range of feasible qualities. This
range of feasible qualities developed in the ﬁrst stage, essentially puts tech-
nological limits to the choice of quality in the second stage. Second, both
the ﬁrms select a quality (from its feasible range) and a corresponding price
to maximize its proﬁts in its own market.
We consider a very simple structure of R&D, where innovation is assumed
to be certain. Consider some ﬁrm with an existing range of feasible quality
[0,q] (where q could be 0), and let [0, e q], denote the planned range of feasible
quality, where e q > q. For increasing the maximal level of feasible quality
from q to e q, the ﬁrm has to incur an R&D cost of F.(e q −q), that is assumed
to be the same for both the ﬁrms. Moreover, production costs are assumed
to be zero.
The number of consumers in the home and the foreign country are n
and n∗ respectively. The preference structures of the home and the foreign
consumers are speciﬁed as follows. Each consumer buys, if at all, only one
3unit of the good. Let u(α,q) denote the utility that a consumer with taste
parameter α derives from consuming one unit of a good of quality q. Then
uq(α,q) > 0, uα(α,q) > 0, uqq(α,q) < 0, and uqα(α,q) > 0, ∀q > 0. (1)
In case a consumer does not consume anything, her reservation utility is zero.
We assume that foreign consumers have a higher total, as well as marginal
willingness-to-pay, for any quality compared to the home consumers. This
diﬀerence may reﬂect cross-country income diﬀerences, as well as taste diver-
sity. This is formalized by assuming that the taste parameter of the foreign
consumers α∗ > α, the taste parameter of the home consumers. Thus, from
(1), these preferences satisfy the following properties:
u(α
∗,q) > u(α,q) > 0, and uq(α
∗,q) > uq(α,q) > 0, ∀q > 0. (2)
We shall generally use the superscript ∗ to denote the foreign market.
Note that our speciﬁcation of the preference structure follows the standard
literature on quality choice, e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979), and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
We then solve the model through backwards induction.
2.2 Quality Choices in Separated Markets
Let the innovated range of feasible qualities in the home market be [0, ˜ q], and
that in the foreign market be [0, ˜ q∗]. Further, let the optimal price-quality
menu in the home market be denoted by (p(˜ q),q(˜ q)), and that in the foreign
market be denoted by (p∗(˜ q∗),q∗(˜ q∗)).
We ﬁrst consider the home market. A representative home consumer ac-
cepts any price-quality menu (p,q) that is individually rational, i.e. provided
she has at least her reservation level of utility
u(α,q) − p ≥ 0. (3)
The standard tie-breaking rule is adopted here, i.e., in case a consumer is
indiﬀerent between buying the good and not buying it, she buys the good.
Next consider the price-quality decision of the monopolist. Optimally,
given q, the monopolist will push consumers to their reservation utility by
charging p = u(α,q). Hence, given that there are no production costs, the
monopolist’s proﬁt is given by
nu(α,q). (4)
Since, ∀q, uq(α,q) > 0, it follows that the home ﬁrm will oﬀer the techno-
logically feasible topmost quality, i.e. q(˜ q) = ˜ q and charge the corresponding
4price p(˜ q) = u(α, ˜ q). Of course, selecting the topmost quality follows from
the assumption of zero production cost. Thus the consumers’ surplus is zero,
and the proﬁt, as well as welfare equals nu(α, ˜ q).
Arguing similarly, the proﬁt-maximizing quality choice in the foreign mar-






Thus the consumers’ surplus is zero, and the proﬁt, as well as welfare equals
n∗u(α∗, ˜ q∗).
Figure 1 illustrates the qualities oﬀered to representative home and foreign
consumers in the two markets for any ˜ q∗ > ˜ q, innovated in the ﬁrst stage.
Note that in the separate national markets, the foreign ﬁrm is not bound to
choose its menu along the self-selection (or incentive compatible) constraint
s∗s∗ for the high-type foreign consumers. Post-integration, however, the ﬁrms
must take into account such a constraint, otherwise the high-type (foreign)
consumers will mimic the low-type (home) consumers.
2.3 Innovation Levels and Technological Asymmetry
We now solve for the R&D decision of the two ﬁrms. We assume that, in the
absence of any R&D, the ﬁrms produce a quality level of zero. Thus, given
the analysis in the preceding sub-section, the home ﬁrm’s problem in stage
1 simpliﬁes to:
max
˜ q nu(α, ˜ q) − F ˜ q, (6)





∗) − F ˜ q
∗. (7)
Thus, the home ﬁrm develops a quality range [0,q] such that q satisﬁes






From our earlier analysis, the home ﬁrm oﬀers the price quality menu (p(q),q(q)),
where p(q) = u(α,q) and q(q) = q, and reaps a net proﬁt equal to,
π(q) = nu(α,q) − Fq. (9)
5Note that the choice of the technological range, q, and hence the price-quality
menu depends on, n, F, as well as the taste parameter. The choice of inno-
vation level in the home market is illustrated in Figure 2.






Hence, from our earlier analysis, the foreign ﬁrm oﬀers the price quality menu









The following lemma provides some comparative statics results on the
relationship between the innovation level in a market and certain aspects of
this market, namely its size and the taste parameter.
Lemma 1. The innovation level in either market will be larger if the
market size increases, or if the consumers’ preference for the good increases.














A similar argument goes through for the foreign market.
Proposition 1 below characterizes the equilibrium outcomes in the two
markets and also compares the equilibrium quality levels, q and q∗. Com-
paring the optimal conditions for innovations in the two markets, it is imme-
diate that the technological asymmetry depends on the relative size of the
two markets and the diﬀerences in the home and foreign consumers’ marginal
willingness-to-pay for quality. A more precise statement follows.
Proposition 1. (i) Consider the domestic market. The quality level
equals q, the consumers’ surplus is zero, and the proﬁt, as well as welfare
equals nu(α,q).
(ii) Consider the foreign market. The quality level equals q∗, the con-
sumers’ surplus is zero, and the proﬁt, as well as welfare equals n∗u(α,q∗).
6(iii) The home ﬁrm develops a lower quality than the foreign ﬁrm, i.e. q











Suppose, for n = ˜ n, the ﬁrms choose the same innovation level, i.e. q(n) = q∗.
Then




Clearly, for n < ˜ n, q(n) < q(n) = q∗, whereas for n > ˜ n, q(n) > q(n) = q∗




Note that a suﬃcient condition for n
n∗ <
uq(α∗,q∗)
uq(α,q∗) is that n ≤ n∗.
Proposition 1 implies that a lower quality may be developed in a larger
market if the marginal willingness-to-pay there is small compared to that in
the smaller market. This is quite consistent with the quality levels observable
in developing and developed countries.4
In the rest of the paper we shall assume that the home ﬁrm is low-quality
compared to the foreign ﬁrm, i.e. q < q∗ (clearly, this is without loss of
generality). By Proposition 1 this is the same as assuming that either the
home market is smaller, or that it is not too large in the sense deﬁned in
(14).
Example. To illustrate what has been discussed above, consider the








From the ﬁrst-order conditions (8) and (10), the innovation levels are
q =
n2α2
4F 2 , and q
∗ =
n∗2α∗2
4F 2 . (16)






4Quality asymmetry across the developing and developed countries has been widely
observed by many researchers. The above discussion oﬀers a simple explanation in terms
of market size and taste diversity (or perhaps income disparity). For a detailed discussion
see Acharyya (2005).
7Since α∗ > α, the home ﬁrm may have a lower quality even if it has a larger
market size.
3 Market Integration
To begin with suppose that the existing quality level of the home ﬁrm is q,
and that of the foreign ﬁrm is q∗. We then examine the case where the two
markets are integrated through removal of trade barriers.
In the integrated market, the consumers can buy the good from either
ﬁrm. We assume away any transport cost. Thus post-integration, there is a
potentially larger market for both the ﬁrms. The question of interest is what
eﬀect such integration will have on the level of innovation by the two ﬁrms.
Will the foreign ﬁrm increase its quality advantage even further, or will the
domestic ﬁrm manage to reduce the diﬀerence, perhaps even leap-frog the
foreign ﬁrm?
For simplicity, we assume that in the post-integration game, in the ab-
sence of any technological innovation, the ﬁrms choose their existing level of
quality. Here the underlying assumption is that, pre-integration, the ﬁrms
have already chosen their quality levels, q and q∗. Given that there is an
existing technology in place, switching to another one, even a lower quality
one, is costly, perhaps because it involves changing to diﬀerent machines, or
diﬀerent work routines.
We examine two alternative 4 stage game form. The ﬁrst game, GF,
involves the following stages:
Stage 1. The foreign ﬁrm decides on its level of R&D.
Stage 2. The home ﬁrm decides on its level of R&D.
Stage 3. The ﬁrms simultaneously decide on their level of quality.
Stage 4. The ﬁrms simultaneously decide on their prices.
This game analyzes the situation where the foreign ﬁrm is quicker in
responding to the altered situation.
We contrast this case with the game GD where, in stage 1, it is the home
ﬁrm that decides on its level of R&D, and, in stage 2, it is the foreign ﬁrm
that decides on its level of R&D. Stages 3 and 4 are the same for both ﬁrms.
Note that the quality-price game, i.e. stages 3 and 4, are modelled along the
lines of Shaked and Sutton (1982).
Analyzing these two alternative game forms allows us to study the eﬀect
that the speed of response has on the ﬁnal outcomes. We solve for the pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the above two games.
Following the standard literature, we assume that each ﬁrm oﬀers only one
8pair of price-quality menu. In addition, we make the following assumption
regarding the composition of the integrated market:
n
n∗ ≥
[u(α∗,q∗) − u(α∗,q)] − [u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)]
u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)
,∀q
∗ > q. (18)
The importance of this assumption will be made clear later. At this point it
is suﬃcient to note that this assumption is quite compatible with our earlier
assumption in (14). We shall elaborate upon this later, though as will be
evident from what follows, the main results remain unchanged even if (18)
precludes (14).
Now in the integrated market, the consumption decision and menus se-
lected do not depend solely on the individual rationality constraint. Since
consumers now can choose from the home and the foreign varieties, the se-
lected menus must also be incentive compatible. More precisely, the α-type




∗ ≥ u(α,q) − p. (19)
Similarly for the α∗ type consumers. The tie-breaking rule is that if con-
sumers are indiﬀerent between the two menus, then they select the menu
with the higher quality.
3.1 Quality and Price Competition in the Integrated
Market
We ﬁrst solve for the pure strategy SPNE of the stage 3 game. The qual-
ity choice in stage 3, (q,q∗), satisﬁes the technological constraints q ≤ q
and q∗ ≤ q∗. Let the price vector in the stage 4 subgame be denoted by
(p(q,q∗),p∗(q,q∗)).
It is clear that whenever q = q∗, the subsequent price game is essentially
a standard Bertrand game with homogeneous products and zero marginal
costs. Hence p(q,q) = p∗(q,q) = 0. Finally let (ˆ q, ˆ q∗,p1(ˆ q, ˆ q∗),p∗(ˆ q, ˆ q∗))
denote a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
The following lemma is critical for the argument.
Lemma 2. Whenever q < q∗, p(q,q∗) cannot be strictly positive.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that p(q,q∗) > 0. To begin with note
that consumers of at least one type must be purchasing from the foreign
ﬁrm. Otherwise it can reduce its price below u(α,q∗) − u(α,q) and attract
both types of consumers.






and, B = u(α,q
∗) − u(α,q) + p(q,q
∗) (21)
Note that A (respectively B) is such that the type-α∗ (respectively type-α)
consumers are indiﬀerent between the price quality conﬁguration oﬀered by
the home and foreign ﬁrms. Given the tie-breaking assumption, if the foreign
ﬁrm charges any price p, where A ≥ p > B, then the type-α∗ consumers
purchase from the foreign ﬁrm, while the type-α consumers purchase from
the home ﬁrm. Whereas if the foreign ﬁrm charges any price p where p ≤ B
then consumers of both the types purchase from it. Clearly, A dominates any
other price p0 such that A > p0 > B, while B dominates any other price p00
such that B > p00. Thus the foreign ﬁrm will either choose A or B. We argue
that in either case the home ﬁrm can charge a price lower than p∗(q,q∗) and
gain.
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Suppose that the foreign ﬁrm is charging A. If the home ﬁrm
deviates by charging p(q,q∗)−, where  > 0, it gains (p(q,q∗)−)n∗ on the
type-α∗ consumers, but looses n on the type-α consumers. For  small, the
gain outweighs the loss.
Case 2. Suppose that the foreign ﬁrm is charging B. Then the home
ﬁrm has no customers and a proﬁt of zero. By charging any price p0 where
0 < p0 < p(q,q∗) it can obtain both types of customers and a strictly positive
proﬁt.
Thus in either case we arrive at a contradiction. Therefore, p(q,q∗) cannot
be strictly positive.
We are now in a position to write down our next proposition.
Proposition 2. There is a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
characterized by following strategies:
Stage 1. ˆ q∗ = q∗ and ˆ q ∈ [0,q]
Stage 2. p(b q, b q∗) = 0 and p∗(b q, b q∗) = u(α, b q∗) − u(α, b q).
Proof. The proof is in several steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst argue that whenever q ≤ q∗, p(q,q∗) = 0 and p∗(q,q∗) =
u(α,q∗)−u(α,q). Note that from lemma 1 the only possible value for p(q,q∗)
is zero. Given this fact the foreign ﬁrm should optimally either charge
u(α∗,q∗)−u(α∗,q) when it obtains the type-α∗ consumers, and has a proﬁt of
n∗[u(α∗,q∗)−u(α∗,q)], or charge u(α,q∗)−u(α,q) when it obtains both types
10of consumers, and has a proﬁt of (n+n∗)[u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)]. Since by the as-
sumption made in (18), (n+n∗)[u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)] ≥ n∗[u(α∗,q∗)−u(α∗,q)],
it is optimal for the foreign ﬁrm to charge [u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)]5. Finally, given
that the foreign ﬁrm charges [u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)], the home ﬁrm cannot charge
a price greater than 0 and gain since it is not going to get any customers.
Step 2. From step 1, the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt is (n+n∗)[u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)].
Since this is increasing in q∗, the result follows.
Step 3. Finally, note that given ˆ q∗ = q∗, the home ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between all possible quality levels, since its proﬁt level is always zero.
Therefore, we have multiple SPNE.6
What happens when the distribution pattern does not satisfy (18)? Un-
fortunately, in this case there is a severe non-existence problem. It is suﬃcient
to argue that there exists (q,q∗) conﬁgurations, such that the corresponding
price game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Consider any (q,q∗) such that q < q∗. Note that from lemma 1 it follows
that p(q,q∗) can only be zero. However, in that case we can mimic the
argument in Proposition 1 to claim that the best response of the foreign
ﬁrm is to charge the price [u(α∗,q∗) − u(α∗,q)]. But then the home ﬁrm
can deviate by charging some price p, where 0 < p < [u(α∗,q∗) − u(α∗,q)] −
[u(α,q∗) − u(α,q)]. In that case the type-α consumers will purchase from the
home ﬁrm and it will have a strictly positive proﬁt. That is, p(q,q∗) cannot
equal zero also. Thus no pure strategy SPNE exists. What happens if we
allow for mixed strategies is an open question.
Thus, in an integrated market, the distribution of consumers across dif-
ferent types plays a crucial role. The nature of the SPNE (i.e. the proﬁt
levels of the two ﬁrms), however, is independent of the distribution.







Thus in this case both (14) and (18) can hold simultaneously. Figure 3
illustrates this possibility.
5We make the tie-breaking assumption that if a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between two price
quality conﬁgurations, then it prefers the one that yields a greater number of consumers.
6The maximum diﬀerentiation solution of Shaked-Sutton (1982) where we have
(b q = 0, b q∗ = q∗) is only one of these SPNE. Moreover, the low quality home ﬁrm always
earns zero proﬁt. Thus in this case quality competition does not relax price competition
for the low quality ﬁrm.
113.2 Innovation Decision in the Integrated Market
In this sub-section we solve for the SPNE of the whole game.
Let Π(q) denote the net proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm if it innovates to a level
q > q∗, given that the foreign ﬁrm does not innovate at all. Similarly, the
net proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm if it alone innovates to some q > q∗ is denoted
by Π∗(q). By Proposition 2, the equilibrium outcome in the price-quality
subgame implies that,
Π(q) = (n + n
∗)[u(α,q) − u(α,q
∗)] − F(q − q) (23)
and, Π
∗(q) = (n + n
∗)[u(α,q) − u(α,q)] − F(q − q
∗). (24)
Given (23) and (24), the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing both Π(q)
and Π∗(q) involve choosing q, where q satisﬁes:
(n + n
∗)uq(α,q) = F. (25)
A few comments are warranted at this point. First, if the foreign ﬁrm does
not innovate at all, then the home ﬁrm will develop such a quality level if the
net proﬁt Π(q) ≡ (n+n∗)[u(α,q) − u(α,q∗)]−F[q−q] is non-negative. But
it is evident that Π(q) varies inversely with q∗ and positively with q. Thus,
the larger is the initial technological gap (q∗ − q), greater is the cost and
smaller is the beneﬁt from innovation. However, as discussed earlier, since the
technology gap determined by the pre-integration R&D eﬀorts itself depends
on the relative size of the two markets, so does the innovation decision of the
home ﬁrm in the integrated market when the foreign ﬁrm does not innovate.
Further, innovation for the foreign ﬁrm is viable whenever Π∗(q) > 0. But
Π∗(q) can be positive even when Π(q) < 0. The following lemma makes a
more precise statement in this regard:
Lemma 3. Π∗(q) > Π(q).
Proof. From (24),
Π
∗(q) ≡ (n + n
∗)[u(α,q) − u(α,q)] − F[q − q
∗].
A little manipulation yields,
Π





The following proposition now characterizes the SPNE of the whole game.
12Proposition 3. (i) Let Π(q) > 0. Then, in GF, ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q.
Whereas in GD, ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q∗.
(ii) Let Π∗(q) > 0 ≥ Π(q). Then, in both GF and GD, ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q.
Proof. Observe that in any SPNE at most one of the ﬁrms will invest a
positive amount in improving its quality. The other ﬁrm will invest nothing.
This is because in equilibrium the gross (of investment) proﬁt of at least one
of the ﬁrms is zero. Thus the net proﬁt of at least one of the ﬁrms will be
strictly negative in case they both invest in quality improvement.
(i) Given that Π(q) > 0, by Lemma 3, Π∗(q) > Π(q) > 0. Hence its
proﬁtable for both the ﬁrms to acquire a quality level of q, assuming that
the other ﬁrm is not going to invest in R&D.
We ﬁrst consider the game, GF, where the foreign ﬁrm ﬁrst decides on
its R&D. Clearly, the foreign ﬁrm’s optimal decision is to either invest till
q, or not to invest at all. In case it does not invest at all, the domestic ﬁrm
will invest till q, and the foreign ﬁrm will have a net proﬁt of zero. Whereas
if it invests in q, then the domestic ﬁrm will not invest at all. Given that
the foreign ﬁrm invests till q, it follows that the domestic ﬁrm’s optimal
investment, in case it invests at all, is q. However, given that the foreign
ﬁrm has the same level of quality i.e. q, the net proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm
is negative. Hence, at any other positive quality level also the net domestic
proﬁt is negative. Given that the domestic ﬁrm does not invest at all, the
foreign ﬁrm will have a net proﬁt of Π∗(q) > 0.
A similar argument shows that, in the game GD, ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q∗.
(ii) If Π∗(q) > 0 ≥ Π(q), then the domestic ﬁrm never ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to innovate even if the foreign ﬁrm does not innovate. Thus optimally only
the foreign ﬁrm innovates.
Example. In terms of our earlier example, it is easy to verify that for
very small initial technology gap, i.e., for n
n∗ close to α
α∗, developing q > q∗ is
viable. More precisely, given any n∗, if n = α
α∗n∗−, then Π(q) = n∗2α
F − > 0.
Proposition 3 above has some very interesting implications. Integrat-
ing the world markets creates technological opportunities for both the ﬁrms.
However, which one of the ﬁrms manage to take advantage of this opportu-
nity depends on the response speed of the two ﬁrms, and their pre-integration
quality levels. If the initial quality level of the domestic ﬁrm is too low to
begin with, then it can never take advantage of these new opportunities. If,
however, the domestic ﬁrm is not too far behind to begin with, then the out-
come depends on the relative speed of response. If the foreign ﬁrm responds
faster (i.e. it is the ﬁrst mover in the R&D stage), then the technological
13gap between the two ﬁrms widen, and the foreign ﬁrm grabs the beneﬁts. If,
however, the domestic ﬁrm is responds faster (i.e. the ﬁrst mover in the R&D
phase), then the technological gap may get reversed, so that the domestic
ﬁrm may grab the technological lead.
4 Gains from Market Integration
In this section we examine the eﬀects of integration on the welfare level. We
consider a pre-integration situation where the R&D costs are sunk, and the
technology level of the domestic ﬁrm is ﬁxed at q, and that of the foreign
ﬁrm is ﬁxed at q∗.
To begin with, we can use our analysis in the previous section to calculate
the post-integration levels of consumers’ surplus, proﬁts and welfare in both
the markets under the various possible equilibria.
Proposition 4. (i) Suppose the post-integration equilibrium involves ˆ q =
q and ˆ q∗ = q. Then, in the domestic market, proﬁt is zero and the consumers
surplus, as well as welfare equals nu(α,q). In the foreign market, consumers’
surplus equals n∗[u(α∗,q)−u(α,q)+u(α,q)], proﬁt equals Π∗(q) and welfare
equals Π∗(q) + n∗[u(α∗,q) − u(α,q) + u(α,q)].
(ii) Suppose the post-integration equilibrium involves ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q∗.
Then, in the domestic market, consumers’ surplus is nu(α,q∗), proﬁt is Π(q)
and welfare is nu(α,q∗) + Π(q). In the foreign market, proﬁt is zero and
consumers’ surplus, as well as welfare equals n∗[u(α∗,q)−u(α,q)+u(α,q∗)].
Interestingly, market integration always beneﬁts the consumers. Integra-
tion has two eﬀects on the consumers. First, is the gain through availability
of a higher quality. Second, the market price may either increase, or decrease.
What our analysis shows, however, is that the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates,
hence the result.
National welfare, however, depends on how the proﬁt of the two ﬁrms
change after integration. First consider the case where ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q.
From Propositions 1 and 4(i), the home ﬁrm undoubtedly loses as it earns
zero proﬁt after integration. But, this is exactly compensated by the gain for
home (or low-type) consumers. Since home consumers now buy q at price
u(α,q) − u(α,q), so home welfare after integration nu(α,q), exactly equals
the pre-integration welfare nu(α,q).
The foreign ﬁrm, on the other hand, may not beneﬁt from integration.
The number of home consumers relative to the number of foreign consumers
14is once again important. The foreign ﬁrm gains if and only if
{(n + n
∗)[u(α,q) − u(α,q)] − F[q − q
∗]} − n
∗u(α,q
∗) > 0. (26)
Next, from Propositions 1 and 4(ii), national welfare of the foreign country




∗,q) − u(α,q)] > 0. (27)
Given that Π∗(q) ≥ 0, this is satisﬁed.
Next consider the case where ˆ q = q and ˆ q∗ = q∗. From Propositions 1
and 4(ii), the foreign ﬁrm loses after market integration. The welfare of the




∗) − u(α,q) + u(α,q)] > 0. (28)
This can be re-written as
Z q
q∗[uq(α
∗,q) − uq(α,q)]dq > 0. (29)
Given that uqα > 0, the above always holds.
Finally, it is easy to show that the national welfare of the home country
unambiguously increases. From Propositions 1 and 4(ii), this holds provided
Π(q) + n[u(α,q
∗) − u(α,q)] > 0, (30)
which is clearly satisﬁed.
Summarizing the preceding discussion we have our ﬁnal result.
Proposition 5. (i) Suppose Π∗(q) > 0 > Π(q). The post-integration
outcome involves the foreign ﬁrm alone innovating. In this case the domestic
welfare is unaﬀected, while foreign welfare increases.
(ii) Suppose Π∗(q) > Π(q) > 0. In GF, the post-integration outcome
involves the foreign ﬁrm alone innovating. In this case the domestic wel-
fare is unaﬀected, while foreign welfare increases. Whereas in GD, the post-
integration outcome involves the domestic ﬁrm alone innovating. In this case
welfare increases in both the countries.
Thus we ﬁnd that integration is welfare improving for both the countries.
There are, however, distributional implications. While the consumers always
gain from such integration, the ﬁrms may, or may not. Whether a ﬁrm gains
or not depends on the pre-integration technological distance between the two
countries, as well as the response speed of the two ﬁrms to the integration.
155 Conclusion
One of the central message of this paper is that integration creates techno-
logical opportunities for both countries, and the outcome depends on which
country manages to grab these opportunities.We show that, post-integration,
quality and price competition between the ﬁrms creates a winner-takes-all sit-
uation, with technological opportunities for both the ﬁrms. However, which
one of the ﬁrms manage to take advantage of this opportunity depends on
the response speed of the two ﬁrms, and their pre-integration quality levels.
If the domestic ﬁrm is not too far behind the foreign ﬁrm to begin with, and
if it responds faster, then the technological gap may get reversed, with the
domestic ﬁrm grabbing the technological lead. Otherwise, however, the for-
eign ﬁrm innovates, with a further widening of the technological gap between
the two ﬁrms.
Further, we ﬁnd that integration may be welfare improving for both the
countries. At least it does not lower welfare of the countries. There are,
however, distributional implications. While the consumers always gain from
such integration, the ﬁrms may, or may not.
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Figure 1: Quality Choices in Separated Markets